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NOTES
NOTICE: THE MANY FORMS IT MAY TAKE UNDER
THE RECORDING ACTS
Not the least vexatious of the host of obstacles that often beset the
practitioner and delay the solution of real property law questions
is the problem of notice. The focal point of any consideration of this
problem is Section 695.01 of Florida Statutes 1951. It provides that
"No conveyance, transfer or mortgage of real property, or of any
interest therein, nor any lease for a term of one year or longer, shall
be good and effectual in law or equity against creditors or subsequent
purchasers for a valuable consideration and without notice,' unless
the same be recorded according to law . .. ."

As stated in this statute, the question of notice arises only when
the instrument is not properly recorded. The purposes of this note
are: to suggest, quite generally, the avenues of approach to the solution of this problem of notice; to point out some of the difficulties
arising under the recording acts; and to mention another aspect of
notice which should not be neglected, namely, lis pendens.
2
The two broad classifications of notice are actual and constructive.
3
These are in turn subdivided. The types of actual notice are express
and implied, 4 while those of constructive notice are notice by possession,s lis pendens,6 and the recording of instruments.7 These divisions,
already confused,8 are further confused by some writers who employ
terms other than the well-established ones. 9

'Italics supplied.
2See Continental Supply Co. v. Marshall, 52 F. Supp. 717 (W.D. Okla. 1943);
Sapp v. Warner, 105 Fla. 245, 141 So. 124 (1932); Lake v. Ford, 224 Ky. 803, 52
S.W.2d 724 (1932).
3See Burdine v. White, 173 Ky. 158, 190 S.W. 687 (1917).
4See, e.g., Rinehart v. Phelps, 150 Fla. 382, 7 So.2d 783 (1942); Sapp v. Warner,
supra note 2; Knapp v. Bailey, 79 Me. 195, 9 At. 122 (1887).
5WADE, LAW OF NoTiCE §41

(1878).

61bid.
7Rinehart v. Phelps, 150 Fla. 382, 7 So.2d 783 (1942).

sSee

5

TIFFANY,

LAW or REAL PROPERTY §1284

(3d ed.

1939).

9See Merrill, The Anatomy of Notice, 3 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 417 (1936).

[114]
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ACTUAL NOTICE

Express. Probably the least difficulty is encountered with this concept of actual notice. A party is charged with knowledge of facts that
he actually knows.1 This information may be obtained either orally
or in writing.",
Implied. This type of actual notice exists when a party fails to
make an inquiry that is reasonably suggested by facts of which he has
actual knowledge. Under such circumstances he is charged with notice
2
of such further facts as the inquiry would have disclosed if made.1
It is distinguished from express notice in that the latter is of facts of
which the person is aware,' 3 whereas in the former the party charged
with notice does not actually know those ultimate facts but has within
his knowledge facts that give rise to a duty to inquire.14 Failure to
make the inquiry results in implied notice, for if the inquiry were
made express notice would result.
In order for the knowledge of facts to raise the duty of inquiry
they must be sufficiently specific"; and must furnish an adequate clue
to the ultimate fact.16 Aside from these tests no set rule can be laid
down as to facts sufficient to raise the duty of inquiry. The Florida
Court in Sapp v. Warner17 said, "a person has no right to shut his
eyes or ears to avoid information, and then say that he has no notice
...." nor can he "remain willfully ignorant of a thing readily ascertainable .. .when the means of knowledge is at hand."' 8 In short,
loRinehart v. Phelps, supra note 7; Faris v. Finnup, 84 Kan. 122, 113 Pac. 407
(1911); Burdine v. White. 173 Ky. 158, 190 S.W. 687 (1917).
"Baltimore v. Whittington, 78 Md. 231, 27 Ad. 984 (1893).
i22inehart v. Phelps, 150 Fla. 382, 7 So.2d 783 (1942).
13"VADE, LAW OF NOTICE §8 (1878).
'4Davidson v. Grady, 105 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1939); Sickler v. Melbourne State
Bank, 118 Fla. 468, 159 So. 678 (1935); Millowners' Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Goff,
210 Iowa 1188, 232 N.W. 504 (1930).
"5Faris v. Finnup, supra note 10; (statement that title good except for small
defect which would be remedied shortly insufficient to raise duty of inquiry because
of indefiniteness).
iGMillman Lumber Co. v. Bryant, 213 Ark. 277, 209 S.W.2d 878 (1948) (advice
that timber rights were possessed by third party gave notice of all rights in third
party); Commercial State Bank v. Blackwell, 61 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933);
Hawkes v. Hoffnan, 56 Wash. 120, 105 Pac. 156 (1909).
17105 Fla. 245, 255, 141 So. 124, 127 (1932).
"Isbid.
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the situation must be such that failure to make inquiry constitutes
2
negligence", or voluntary ignorance. o
CONSTRUcTIvE NOTICE

Constructive notice is the law's substitute for actual notice.2 1 It
is notice imputed by law, and it cannot be rebutted when the facts
22
giving rise to it are shown to be present.
Possession. Constructive notice arising from possession operates
in conjunction with the recording acts. The two usual kinds of recording statutes are the "without notice" 23 and the "without actual
notice" 24 types.
It is generally held in Florida and in other states having a withoutnotice statute that possession, whether known by the subsequent purchaser or not, 25 gives constructive notice of whatever rights the occupant or the person under whom he claims has in the land. 21 It extends to facts which would have been ascertained by a reasonable
inquiry made as to the rights of the one in possession.27
The interpretations of the without-actual-notice type of statute
are quite diverse. At one extreme are the Massachusetts courts. They
hold that what is meant by actual notice is knowledge of the unrecorded deed. Knowledge of possession of the land and improvements
thereon is not sufficient to impart notice. 28 Furthermore, the knowledge of facts concerning possession sufficient to raise a duty of inquiry
does not constitute notice under this interpretation of the without19See Cooper v. Flesner, 24 Okla. 47, 103 Pac. 1016 (1909) (advice not to purchase from spouse of adverse claimant sufficient to raise duty of inquiry).
20WADE, LAW Or NOTICE §8 (1878).

21See Butte & Superior Copper Co. v. Clark Montana Realty Co., 249 U.S. 12
(1919).
22Sapp v. Warner, 105 Fla. 245, 141 So. 124 (1932).
23FLA. STAT. §695.01 (1951).
24MAS. ANN. LAWS c. 183, §4 (1952).
25King v. Paulk, 85 Ala. 186, 4 So. 825 (1888); Tate v. Pensacola Gulf, Land &
Devel. Co., 37 Fla. 439, 20 So. 542 (1896); Delosh v. Delosh, 171 Mich. 175, 137 N.W.

81 (1912).
26Mercer v. Miller, 157 Fla. 78, 24 So.2d 893 (1946); Wilkins v. Bevier, 43 Minn.
213, 45 N.W. 157 (1890); Healy v. Wostenberg, 47 Wyo. 375, 38 P.2d 325 (1934).
27Kushler v. Weber, 182 Mich. 224, 148 N.W. 418 (1914); Niles v. Cooper, 98
Minn. 39, 107 N.W. 744 (1906).
2sMcCarthy v. Lane, 301 Mass. 125, 16 N.E.2d 683 (1938).
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actual-notice statute. 29 In Sibley v. Leffingwill,30 the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts expressly approved a lower court's instruction that
the ".... evidence that the demandant, holding an unrecorded deed
of the premises, had been and was in open possession and occupation
thereof at the time of attachment or levy, was not sufficient to warrant
them [the jury] in finding that the tenant had actual notice of such
deed . . ." This strict interpretation is not generally accepted. A
more logical construction is that there is "actual notice" when the
possession is known. 31 The usual construction of the without-actualnotice statute is the same as the without-notice statute; that is, exclusive possession under an unrecorded deed, whether known to the
purchaser or not, is sufficient to constitute constructive notice. 32
Courts adopting this interpretation reason that it is the duty of a
purchaser of real property to make inquiry respecting the rights of
the party in possession, and failing to do so he is deemed to have constructive notice of such facts as would have come to his knowledge in
the proper discharge of that duty.
Generally in order for possession to impart constructive notice it
must be open, 33 visible,3 4 exclusive, 35 and unambiguous. 36 A person
is not charged with notice of an unrecorded instrument, however,
when he in good faith and with reasonable diligence makes the inquiry that is suggested without learning of the adverse interest.37
Similarly he is not charged with notice when the duty of inquiry
raised by the possession is not performed, if such an inquiry would
have been to no avail38 Further, if the records show that the possessor has a limited interest in the property, his possession is notice
only of that interest and does not raise a duty of inquiry as to any
2gSouth

Street Inn, Inc. v. Muehsam, 323 Mass. 310, 81 N.E.2d 821 (1948).

3090 Mass. (8 Allen) 584, 585 (1864).

3'Brinkman v. Jones, 44 Wis. 498 (1878).
32Malamed v. Sedelsky, 367 Pa. 353, 80 A.2d 853 (1951).
33Blackburn v. Venice Inlet Co., 38 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1948); Carolina Portland
Cement Co. v. Roper, 68 Fla. 299, 67 So. 115 (1914) (acts of surveying land, digging
holes in it to test quality, and conducting prospective purchasers over it insufficient
to impart notice).
8'lbid.
51bid.

36Wickes v. Lake, 25 Wis. 71 (1869).
37Hellman v. Levy, 55 Cal. 117 (1880); Ellison v. Torpin, 44 W. Va. 414, 30
S.E. 183 (1898); cf. Emeric v. Alvarado, 90 Cal. 444, 27 Pac. 356 (1891).
3SAustin v. Southern Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 122 Ga. 439, 50 S.E. 382 (1905);
Carr v. Maltby, 165 N.Y. 557, 59 N.E. 291 (1901).
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other possible interest that he may have. 39 Thus when the public
records show that one in possession is a tenant in common, his possession is notice of his interest of record only and does not constitute
notice of any interest not of record that he may have in the undivided
40
interest of the other tenant in common.
A tenant's possession is sufficient to raise the duty of inquiry as
to the rights of his landlord;41 but it has been held that possession
by a grantor himself after he has made a conveyance will not constitute constructive notice of any right retained by him, 42 the presumption being that the grantor is occupying at the sufferance of the
grantee. 43 If, however, the grantor's possession continues more than
a reasonable time, it will be sufficient to constitute notice of whatever
44
right he may have retained.
When a tenant attorns to his landlord's grantee and remains in
possession, his continued possession does not give notice to a subsequent purchaser from the original landlord of the unrecorded deed
by which that landlord had conveyed to the first grantee. 45 The theory
is that the subsequent purchaser has no reason to suspect a transfer of
the landlord's title when there is no visible change in possession to
indicate to him that there has been a change in ownership. 46 This
rule applies even when the subsequent purchaser is not aware that
47
the tenant had originally held under the landlord.
Lis pendens. Under the common law doctrine of lis pendens, when
property is the subject of litigation the existence of the suit itself
gives notice to all the world, and anyone asserting rights in the
property takes subject to the judgment or decree. 48 This is true even
39Kirby v. Tallmadge, 160 U.S. 379 (1896); Schumacher v. Truman, 134 Cal. 430,
66 Pac. 591 (1901); Tyler v. Johnson, 61 Fla. 730, 55 So. 870 (1911).
40Tyler v. Johnson, 61 Fla. 730, 55 So. 870 (1911).
4'See note 26 supra.
42McEwen v. Keary, 178 Mich. 6, 144 N.W. 524 (1913); cf. Truman v. Bell, 54
Ark. 273, 15 SAW. 886 (1891).
43C7. Truman v. Bell, 54 Ark. 273, 15 SAV. 886 (1891).
441bid.
45Feinberg v. Stearns, 56 Fla. 279, 47 So. 797 (1908); Stockton v. National Bank
of Jacksonville, 45 Fla. 590, 34 So. 897 (1903).
46King v. Paulk, 85 Ala. 186, 4 So. 825 (1888); Stockton v. National Bank of
Jacksonville, supra note 45.
47Mallette v. Kaehler, 141 Il. 70, 30 N.E. 549 (1892); Phelan v. Brady, 119 N.Y.
587, 23 N.E. 1109 (1890). But see 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §1291 (3d ed. 1939).
4STilton v. Cofield, 93 U.S. 163 (1876); Elizabethport Cordage Co. v. Whitlock,

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol6/iss1/3

6

Killian: Notice: The Many Forms It May Take Under the Recording Acts
NOTES

if the purchaser knows nothing of the litigation.49 The efficacy of
the doctrine is not limited to one purchasing from a voluntary grantor
but applies to one who acquires an interest by judicial 50 or execution
sale.51 It does not, however, affect subsequent purchasers from persons
who are not parties to the suit and whose claims are independent of
the rights in litigation. 52 The doctrine is effective from the time suit
5
is begun13 until the entry of final judgment. 4
In Florida, as in many other states,35 the doctrine has been modified by statutes prescribing a specific procedure for recording a notice
of property involved in pending litigation. 56 Under the Florida statute if the lis pendens notice is not filed, an innocent purchaser without actual knowledge of the litigation will be deemed to have taken
57
without notice.
Although the statute modifies the common law as to when the constructive notice is given and as to how long this notice continues, it
does not otherwise alter the scope of the common law doctrine. 58
Recording of Instruments. The purpose of our recording acts5 9
is to protect subsequent creditors 60 or purchasers for value from
37 Fla. 190, 20 So. 255 (1896); Murray v. Ballou, 1 John's Ch. 566 (N.Y. 1815); cf.
Porter v. Barclay, 18 Ohio St. 547 (1869).
40Blanchard v. Ware, 43 Iowa 530 (1876).
GoRandall v. Duff, 79 Cal. 115, 21 Pac. 610 (1889); Rider v. Kelso, 53 Iowa 367,
5 N.V. 595 (1880).
-'Brinkley v. Sanford, 99 Ga. 130, 25 S.E. 32 (1896); Gibbs v. Davis, 93 Ky. 466,
20 S.W. 385 (1892).
52Miller v. Sherry, 2 Wall. 237 (U.S. 1864); Knox v. Spratt, 19 Fla. 817 (1883);
Harrod v. Burke, 76 Kan. 909, 92 Pac. 1128 (1907).
-3The filing of the original pleadings and the serving of the defendant ordinarily constitute the commencement of the suit, Norris v. Ile, 152 Ill. 190, 38 N.E.
762 (1894); Shufeldt v. Jefcoat, 50 Okla. 790, 151 Pac. 595 (1915); Staples v, White,
Handley & Co., 88 Tenn. 30, 12 S.W. 339 (1889).
54Eich v. Czervonko, 330 Ill. 455, 161 N.E. 864 (1928).
5

5TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §1296 (3d ed. 1939).
56FLA. STAT. §47A9 (1951), Riesen v. Maryland Casualty Co., 153 Fla. 205, 14

So.2d 197 (1943) (notice must be recorded in county where property in litigation
is situated).
S7Cole v. Lee, 57 Fla. 387, 49 So. 1017 (1909).
GSn De Pass v. Chitty, 90 Fla. 77, 105 So. 148 (1925), the Court construed FLA.
REv. GEN. STAT. §2853 (1920), a predecessor to FLA. STAT. §47A9 (1951). The
subsequent changes in the statute would not abrogate the holding of that case.
r9FLA. STAT. c. 695 (1951).
GORogers v. Munnerlyn, 36 Fla. 591, 18 So. 669 (1895), held that "creditor" as
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secret transactions."' By requiring the holder of an interest in land
to record the instrument in order to preserve his priority over subsequent good faith purchasers and creditors, the recording acts penalize
the nonrecorder for allowing the public record to mislead.02
3
The Florida act relating to recordation of interests in land" is of
the usual and most sensible type. It provides that an instrument within its scope is not effectual against subsequent creditors or purchasers
for value unless it is recorded. Under this statute the determining
factor is whether the first instrument has been recorded prior to the
execution of the second.64 If it has not, there is no notice.
Another Florida statute65 originally provided that constructive
notice should commence at the time the instrument was delivered to
the recording officer for recordation. 66 On the basis of this statute
it was held that constructive notice was given when the instrument
was recorded in the wrong record book.67 Another decision s construing this statute held that an error 9 by the clerk in transcribing the
description of the land upon the record did not prevent the erroneous
record from giving notice of the deed as it actually read. Soon after
the latter case was decided the result reached in it was rendered improbable thereafter by the addition to the statute of a clause reading
"....

and as so recorded and transcribed upon the record shall be notice

to all persons."70

This amendment does not, however, necessarily

used in FLA. REv. STAT. §1972 (1892) means not a creditor at large but one who
has secured a lien by judgment or attachment. FLA. STAT. §695.01 (1951) reads
exactly the same as FLA. REv. STAT. §1972 (1892).
6
'See Rabinowitz v. Keefer, 100 Fla. 1723, 132 So. 297 (1931).
62Van Eepoel Real Estate Co. v. Sarasota Milk Co., 100 Fla. 438, 129 So. 892
(1930), followed in Hub Supply Co. v. Dunedin Real Estate Co., 100 Fla. 471,
129 So. 904 (1930).
63FLA. STAT. §695.01 (1951).
64Feinberg v. Stearns, 56 Fla. 279, 47 So. 797 (1908). Statutes in some jurisdictions permit the holder of an unrecorded deed to defeat the interest of a subsequent
purchaser by recording first, e.g., MIca. STAT. §26.547 (1951), Drake v. McLean,
47 Mich. 102, 10 N.W. 126 (1881).
65FLA. STAT. §695.11 (1951).
66FLA. CoMP. GEN. LAws §5708

(1927).

67Cawthon v. Stearns Culver Lumber Co., 60 Fla. 313, 53 So. 738 (1910).
6SFederal Land Bank of Columbia v. Dekle, 108 Fla. 555, 148 So. 756 (1933).
09The clerk in recording a mortgage erroneously described the land as all of
the west half of Sec. 1, while the land in fact and as described in the mortgage was
all of the north half of Sec. 1.
7OFLA. CoMP. GEN. LAws §5708 (1927), as amended, Fla. Laws 1935, c. 17217,
§1, now appears as FLA. STAT. §695.11 (1951), which reads: "All instruments re-
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alter the prior holding that an instrument recorded in the wrong
book gives notice.
A properly recorded instrument' gives constructive notice to the
world of the rights of the parties in the instrument. If the record reveals facts which suggest an inquiry as to other rights, constructive
notice will be imputed of such of those rights as would have been
disclosed by investigation.72 But notice will be imputed only of rights
73
in the chain of title through which the subsequent purchaser claims.
Another situation to be coped with arises when there is a failure
to index the instrument as prescribed by statute. Even though the
index to the records is important, some courts have held that it is not
a part of the record and that infirmities therein will not protect a
subsequent purchaser,7 4 the theory being that to hold indexing necessary before the record is valid will lead to doubt and confusion as to
the priority of conveyances.75 Other courts construe the statute so as
to make the index a part of the record, thereby making it a necessity
that the instrument be indexed before it will operate as notice to a
subsequent purchaser. 76 This construction is based upon the reasoning
that when the recording statute and the indexing statute are enacted
at the same time and are in pari materia, the complete statute is not
complied with until the instrument is indexed.7 There are no Florida
cases on this point but Florida would probably follow the rule that
failure to index, alone, does not nullify the record as notice to a subsequent purchaser. This supposition is based upon the fact that enactments of the recording statutes and the indexing statutes were
lating to real and personal property which are authorized or required to be recorded shall be deemed to be recorded from time [sic] the same are filed with the
officer whose duty it is to record the same and as so recorded and transcribed upon
the record shall be notice to all persons."
71FLA. STAT. §695.03 (1951) requires that an instrument be acknowledged before
it is eligible for record. See FLA. STAT. §695.10 (1951) for the manner in which
an instrument may be made eligible for record when an acknowledgment cannot
be had.
72Sapp v. Warner, 105 Fla. 245, 141 So. 124 (1932); Mettart v. Allen, 139 Ind.
644, 39 N.E. 239 (1894); Sweet v. Henry, 175 N.Y. 268, 67 N.E. 574 (1903).
73Mansfield v. Johnson, 51 Fla. 239, 40 So. 196 (1906) (recorded conveyance from
beneficiary of secret trust deed did not give notice to creditor of trustee).
74Agurs v. ]elcher & Creswell, 111 La. 378, 35 So. 607 (1903). Contra: Koch v.
West, 118 Iowa 468, 92 N.W. 663 (1902).
7-Curtis v. Lyman, 24 Utah 338 (1852).
76Barney v. McCarty, 15 Iowa 510 (1864).
77Ibid.
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widely separated in time78 Further support can be inferred from the
tendency the Florida court has manifested to uphold the validity of
the record as notice when an error has been made by the clerk in
recording °
The recording of an instrument not authorized or required by
law to be recorded does not give constructive notice to a subsequent
purchaser.80 When, however, a subsequent purchaser sees the recorded
instrument which is not authorized to be recorded, virtually all jurisdictions charge him with actual notice.81 Whether an instrument is
82
authorized to be recorded is determined by statute.
CONCLUSION

Considering the scope of notice and the fact that it has undergone treatment at the hands of forty-eight different jurisdictions, it
is not surprising that difficulty is often encountered in this field. The
existence of confusion, however, does not justify a reclassification of
the types of notice, as has been suggested by one writer.8 3 Such action
would at least lead to a temporary stage of utter confusion without
any assurance of rectifying the existing situation. The courts would
again be faced with questions of interpretation - the old problem in
disguise. Since the existing perplexity is due in a large part to a lack
of understanding of the elements, functions, and philosophies of
the basic types of notice plus inconsistent application of notice terminology to factual situations, the answer to the dilemma could perhaps
better come from judges and attorneys themselves. At least it is
reasonable to expect that on the part of the courts a more exacting
and analytical consideration of factual situations coupled with more
consistent employment of notice terminology would be of great aid
in clarifying a troublesome area of the law.
HOWARD L. KILLIAN

78FLA, STAT. §695.01 (1951), our recording act, was enacted as Fla. Laws 1828,
§§4, 9, whereas FLA. STAT. §28.22 (1951), our indexing statute, first appeared as
FLA. REV. STAT. §1391 (1892).
79Federal Land Bank v. Dekle, supra note 68; Cawthon v. Stearns Culver Lumber
Co., supra note 67.
8OMalsby v. Gamble, 61 Fla. 327, 54 So. 766 (1911).
8'E.g., Parkside Realty Co. v. MacDonald, 166 Cal. 426, 137 Pac. 21 (1913);
Lassiter v. Curtiss-Bright Co., 129 Fla. 728, 177 So. 201 (1937); Phillis v. Gross,
32 S.D. 438, 143 N.W. 373 (1913).
2

8 See F A. STAT. §§28.21, 28.22 (1951).

s3Merrill, The Anatomy of Notice, 3 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 417 (1936).
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